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In the literature of artificial moral agents (AMAs), most work is influenced by either 
deontological or utilitarian frameworks. It has also been widely acknowledged that these 
Western “rule-based” ethical theories have encountered both philosophical and 
computing challenges. To tackle these challenges, this paper explores a non -Western, 
role-based, Confucian approach to robot ethics. In this paper, we start by providing a 
short introduction to some theoretical fundamentals of Confucian ethics. Then, we 
discuss some very preliminary ideas for constructing a Confucian approach to robot 
ethics. Lastly, we briefly share a couple of empirical studies our research group has 
recently conducted that aimed to incorporate insights from Confucian ethics into the 
design of morally competent robots. Inspired by Confucian ethics, this paper argues that 
to design morally competent robots is to create not only reliable and efficient human -
robot interaction, but also a robot-mediated environment in which human teammates 
can grow their own virtues. 
 




In the literature of artificial moral agents (AMAs), most work is influenced by either 
deontological or utilitarian frameworks (Vallor, 2018). It has also been widely 
acknowledged that these Western “rule-based” ethical theories have encountered both 
philosophical and computing challenges. Most notably, these frameworks often struggle 
to “accommodate the constant flux, contextual variety, and increasingly opaque horizon 
of emerging technologies and their applications” (Vallor, 2018, p. 209). To tackle these 
challenges, this paper explores a non-Western, role-based, Confucian approach to 
robot ethics. In contrast to the Western philosophical approaches to robot ethics (or 
ethics in general) that focus on “defin[ing] what the good is” and worry about “how one 
can come to know the good,” Chinese philosophers represented by Confucian scholars 
are more interested in the problem of “how to become good” (Ivahoe, 2000, p. ix). 
Inspired by Confucian ethics, this paper argues that to design morally competent robots 
is to create not only reliable and efficient human-robot interaction, but also a robot-




We argue that exploring a Confucian approach to robot ethics has critical values 
in a variety of ways. For instance, philosophers have recently argued that Confucian 
ethics can provide other alternative ways of thinking about ethical issues associated 
with robotics. As argued by Pak-Hang Wong, “if the philosophy of AI and robotics only 
comes from the West, that won’t be enough, because it won’t always apply to non -
Western countries… And you miss opportunities to think in different ways about 
technology” (Cassauwers, 2019). In other words, Confucian ethics along with other non-
Western ethical resources can enrich the moral imagination of roboticists and enhance 
their capabilities to define and engage ethical issues in designing robotics from 
culturally diverse perspectives.  
Another crucial value for studying Confucian robot ethics is concerned with the 
powerful role that China and other cultures with the Confucian heritage (CHCs) such as 
Japan, Korea, and Singapore assume in the global market and the global robotics 
community. Understanding Confucian ethics is critical for understanding how 
policymakers, industrial entrepreneurs, scientists, and the public in CHCs view and 
accompany robotics.  
In this paper, we start by providing a short introduction to some theoretical 
fundamentals of Confucian ethics. Then, we discuss some very preliminary ideas for 
constructing a Confucian approach to robot ethics. Lastly, we briefly share a couple of 
empirical studies our research group has recently conducted that aimed to incorporate 
insights from Confucian ethics into the design of morally competent robots.   
 
 
Confucian ethics: Theoretical fundamentals 
 
In recent decades, philosophers have employed various approaches to engaging 
Confucian ethics ranging from overtly historical or textual approaches to comparative 
approaches that put ideas from the classical period into conversation with contemporary 
Western ethical, social, and scientific theories (Mattice, 2019). Scholars have tried to 
understand Confucian ethics as a species of deontology, virtue ethics, or care ethics 
(Mattice, 2019). Until very recently, scholars have attempted to theorize Confucian 
ethics as a kind of role-based moral theory (Ames, 2011; Rosemont & Ames, 2016). 
The role-based approach to Confucian ethics is one of most recent efforts to reinterpret 
and rediscover the value of Confucian ethics. Confucian role ethics argues that we as 
humans were born into a web of social relationships. These social relationships have 
normative implications and they prescribe specific moral responsibilities for us in the 
communities we belong to. Ames (2011) argues that the term person itself is relational 
and social (e.g., it is hard to call a human “person” if she is the only human in the world). 
For instance, the father-daughter relationship does not only have descriptive values 
(e.g., describing an objective relationship between me and my daughter) but also has 
normative implications (e.g., what a healthy father-daughter relationship looks like, what 
expectations about being a good father are, what I should do to live my role as a father). 
Therefore, the Confucian ultimate goal of becoming a good person depends on to what 
extent we live well our social roles and practice well the moral responsibilities 




Relationships, contexts, and social roles are crucial in Chinese philosophy 
especially Confucian ethics. The cultivation of the moral self including various virtues 
such as the principal virtue ren (仁, benevolence, goodness, or humaneness) takes 
place in the development of relationships (Lai, 2017). A person seldom grows her 
virtues at home by herself through her own individual actions and reflections. Instead, 
reliable virtues are required to be cultivated, tested, and enhanced in her interactions 
with others in specific contexts while living her communal roles. As a father, I learn 
virtues that define a good father not from reading books but from interactions with my 
daughter. The term father is coexistent with the term daughter. My daughter provides 
me with opportunities to develop the virtues that are required for being a good father. 
Cultivating virtues is thus a project that is engaged in concert with others. 
Compared to most Western ethical approaches that focus on moral reasoning 
and justification, Confucian ethics places more emphasis on moral practice and 
practical wisdom. What is central to Confucian ethics is the moral development model 
that consists of three interrelated components: observation, reflection, and practice 
(Zhu, 2018). In other words, one must carefully observe how people in the society 
interact with others and reflect on whether and how their daily interactions with others 
are in accordance with  li (礼, rituals or ritual propriety). The appropriate practice of 
rituals manifests virtues, whereas virtues underlie and guide the practice of these 
rituals. Then, one needs to incorporate her reflective learning experience into her own 
future interactions with others and test to what extent she has grasped the appropriate 
practice of rituals and their underlying moral virtues.  
For Confucians, li or rituals are crucial for ethics practice and they are the social 
norms that are rooted in historical traditions and have been widely recognized as 
morally accepted norms in specific cultural contexts (Lai, 2003). Therefore, virtues (e.g., 
ren) and li are independent of each other (Lai, 2017; Shun, 1993). To demonstrate that 
one understands well a virtue such as ren, one needs to express it through appropriate 
ritual practice in her interactions with others. Conversely, her manner of interaction with 
others indicates her grasp of the virtue of ren. In this sense, Confucian criteria for 
evaluating one’s moral development are social as they depend on to what extent people 
comprehend and appropriately practice rituals in their social interactions. In other words, 
someone who fails to or is unwilling to reflectively practice rituals misses opportunities 
for moral growth and thus is not a responsible person. 
If the ultimate goal for Confucians is that one is always striving to become a good 
person through reflective learning in social interactions, then the question becomes 
whether everyone has the equal opportunity to achieve such goal. As a follower of 
Confucius, Mencius advocated for a kind of moral egalitarianism and believed that all 
human beings have the equal potential to become good if they devote themselves to 
intentional moral efforts (Munro, 1969, p. 15). To Confucians, what characterizes the 
personhood is not so much about one’s innate and inalienable indiv idual human rights 
as most Western political and ethical theories would emphasize. Instead, Confucians 
think that it is one’s intentional efforts to strive for a good person that defines her 
personhood. Simply eating and sleeping without much reflective th inking will not make 






Toward a Confucian robot ethics 
 
A recent essay published in OZY by Tom Cassauwers (2019) aimed to reexamine 
ethical issues associated with robotics from two Eastern schools of thought: 
Confucianism and Buddhism. This essay includes interviews he conducted with multiple 
Eastern philosophers including two Confucian scholars Pak-Hang Wong and Heup 
Young Kim. An important theme in Confucian ethics of technology acknowledged by 
both Wong and Kim is that technology is never value neutral and it has crucial 
instrumental value that helps people acquire virtues such as ren and cultivate the moral 
self (Cassauwers, 2019). For instance, Wong mentioned an example in a recent 
redesign of Amazon’s virtual assistant Alexa: designers have developed a new feature 
“politeness feature” for Alexa which will make Alexa only respond to people who speak 
to Alexa politely. Wong argues that such minor design could be made by a Confucian 
(Cassauwers, 2019).  
Nevertheless, arguably, there remains a question whether these Amazon 
designers were actually inspired by Confucian ethical theories or more specifically 
Confucian moral psychology. Such question is worth exploring as it is relevant to the 
argument discussed earlier that relationships and contexts are important for Confucian 
ethics. The effectiveness of Alexa’s politeness feature may be dependent on the 
specific role Alexa plays in a context and the relationship between Alexa and the human 
interlocutor. I as the father refuse to respond to my daughter’s impolite request might 
have different moral impacts on her than if a stranger does the same reaction. 
Philosophers of technology such as Peter-Paul Verbeek would agree that design 
engineers do have the obligation to imagine the potential relationship that will be 
constructed between technology and its user and how such relationship affects the 
moral perception and behavior of the user (Verbeek, 2006).    
What people are often overlooking is the relational nature embedded in the 
design of most robots especially social robots which are being integrated into our 
society. When robots are being designed, certain relationships are imagined, defined, 
and assigned to those robots and these relationships are often determined by the use 
contexts of robots and the specific roles robots are expected to assume in these 
contexts (e.g., healthcare robots). Dumouchel and Damiano (2017) recently argue that 
social robots such as Geminoid and Paro can only truly interact with other agents, and 
not with objects. Unlike humans, these robots have no relation to the world but to their 
human partners. These robots were mainly created for the interaction or relationship 
with human partners. It is the interaction or relationship between robots and their human 
partners that makes the existence of these robots. In this sense, we suggest that 
roboticists should not only leverage the traditional, dominant approaches to developing 
AMAs that focus on integrating rule-based morality, but also consider an alternative 
approach to designing morally competent robots based on the role responsibilities 
prescribed by the relationships robots have with human teammates in specific use 
contexts.  
Philosopher JeeLoo Liu (2017) constructed three principles for Confucian robotic 
ethics that are based on the role moralities of robots:  
 




[CR2] A robot should not act in ways that would afflict the highest displeasure or 
the lowest preference onto other human beings, when other options are available.    
[CR3] A robot must render assistance to other human beings in their pursuit of 
moral improvement, unless doing so would violate [CR1] and [CR2]. A robot must also 
refuse assistance to other human beings when their projects would bring out their evil 
qualities or produce immorality.    
 
Liu’s three Confucian robotic ethical principles well integrate major elements of 
Confucian ethics we introduced in the last section. A moral competent robot is expected 
to be able to fulfill its assigned social roles. Such fulfillment of social roles for this robot 
is not isolated from but in concert with other humans. For humans, self -cultivation is not 
an individual but a social project which the robot can contribute to. In other words, the 
interaction between the robot and its human teammate is indeed crucial for the human’s 
pursuit of moral development. A socially integrated robot is expected to be sensitive to 
the norms shared within human communities and contribute to the evolution of these 
norms.  
Confucius would probably argue that a social robot who is not capable of 
rendering assistance to humans in their pursuit of moral improvement is not worth  being 
a companion for humans. Such judgment of the moral quality of the robot is comparable 
to Confucius’s thesis that moral cultivation is essential to friendship. Interestingly, 
philosophers David Hall and Roger Ames (1994) argue that Confucian friendship is 
hierarchical despite that the hierarchy in friendship is different from that in other four 
Confucian relationships such as the father-son relationship. The hierarchy that exists in 
friendship recognizes that difference exists in the level of moral excellence between 
oneself and her friend (Lu, 2010). That is partly why Confucius said “do not accept as a 
friend one who is not your equal” (Analects, 1.8). Here, friendship as a relationship does 
have instrumental value, that is, a good or worthwhile friendship often provides 
opportunities and resources for the cultivation of the moral self. If we treat friendship as 
a paradigmatic case for the relationship between most social robots and their human 
teammates, then shouldn’t we always strive to find robots who are capable of making us 
better people? Social robots may be distinguished in terms of their different capabilities 
of completing tasks. However, we argue that they should also be distinguished by their 
different capabilities of exerting positive impacts on the moral development of their 
human teammates.  
The emerging literature in responsible innovation suggests that design is a “far 
richer process” as it realizes both functional requirements and moral values.” Designers 
not only “can provide us with technical means but also can address the values of people 
and society and think about expressing them in material culture and technology” (van 
den Hoven, Vermaas, & van de Poel, 2015, p. 3). Therefore, roboticists should not 
simply consider robots as efficient means to help human users complete tasks. 
Moreover, for designing a social robot, roboticists need to consider other morally 
relevant issues such as: 
 




• What are characteristics or “traits” of this robot that defines it as a morally 
competent or “good” robot? How does the assigned role of the robot prescribe or 
specify these characteristics or “traits”? 
• What kind of person is the human teammate becoming through her everyday 
interaction with the robot? 
 
Social robots can be considered as companions with whom humans spend a lot of time. 
Nevertheless, does that mean a truly socially integrated robot has always to be polite 
and please its human teammate, even when the human teammate proposes morally 
questionable requests? Alistair M. C. Isaac and Will Bridewell (2017) point out that 
“standing norms” (baseline rules for effective human conversations such as “being polite 
or informative”) are important for robots to be truly socially integrated and effectively 
communicate with humans. However, they also note that in meaningful conversations 
ulterior motives often are more fundamental to and thus supersede these standing 
norms. In other words, when designing strategies robots employ to respond to human 
requests, roboticist need to consider the ulterior motives (e.g., being a good companion) 
that are communicated through robot responses to human requests, in addition to the 
standing norms that are expected to be followed by robots and human teammates.   
Therefore, is it okay for robots to blame morally questionable requests proposed 
by their human teammates as a person would do to another person (e.g., a friend)? 
From the Confucian perspective, one may argue that the way in which the robot 
responds to the human request is highly contextual and it depends on a variety of 
factors such as: under what context the human teammate asks the request, what role 
this robot plays, what relationship the robot and the human teammate has established, 
the level of ethical sensitivity the human teammate exhibits, and how much the robot 
“knows” the nature or personality of its human teammate. It is also worth noting that the 
relationship between the robot and its human teammate may also change as they 
interact with each other on the daily basis. For instance, if the relationship between a 
robot and its human teammate is reliable and trustworthy which is comparable to 
friendship in the Confucian sense, then it might be justifiable that the robot should be 
able to remonstrate with or blame its human teammate. Arguably, the role responsibility 
of the robot prescribed by its relationship with the human teammate encourages the 
robot to be responsible for the moral development of the other one who also contributes 
to such relationship. This argument is supported by Liu’s third Confucian robotic ethical 
principle we mentioned earlier.                
To some extent, despite the importance of role responsibility in Confucian ethics, 
Western philosophers hold different views on the connection between social roles and 
relationships and autonomous moral agency. To Western philosophers such as 
Dumouchel and Damiano (2017), the social roles and relationships assigned by 
roboticists to robots make robots less independent and thus have less moral agency 
which is fundamental for most Western political philosoph ical concepts such as liberty 
and autonomy. As discussed earlier, social robots are often designed to work in specific 
circumstances and serve certain purposes for humans. They are not independent and 
do not have or pursue their own goals. Dumouchel and Damiano (2017) argue that only 




human personhood. Not having an explicit and predetermined purpose indicates that 
these robots are free to do anything they want.         
In contrast, Asian philosophies pay less attention to the individualistic and liberal 
assumption of moral agency or personhood and instead they place more emphasis on 
the importance of social roles and relationship to personhood. Arguably, Asian 
philosophies such as Confucianism and Buddhism may provide possibilities “for 
nonhumans [such as robots] to reach the status of humans” (Cassauwers, 2019). As 
argued by Wong,  
 
In Confucianism, the state of reaching personhood is not a given. You need to 
achieve it. The person’s attitude toward certain ethical virtues determines 
whether or not they reach the status of a human. That also means that we can 
attribute personhood to nonhuman things like robots when they play ethically 
relevant roles and duties as humans (Cassauwers, 2019).  
 
Philosophical justifications for personhood in the West and the East may further lead to 
cultural differences in the public perceptions of robots. Spanish philosopher Jordi 
Vallverdú notices the cultural differences in human perceptions of robots between  East 
and West: “Westerners are generally reluctant about the nature of robotics and AI, 
considering only humans as true beings, while Easterners more often consider devices 
as similar to humans” (Cassauwers, 2019).  
 
 
Confucian ethics and designing morally competent robots 
 
In this section, we are trying to provide some practical examples that demonstrate 
possible ways in which Confucian ethics can help to understand, inform, and shape the 
design of robots, and how this design process can help us refine our understanding of 
Confucian ethics. 
One of the fundamental activities undertaken by robot designers is the 
identification, refinement, and application of design patterns (Alexander, et al., 1977; 
Borchers, 2000; Kahn, et al., 2008): abstract patterns of human interaction with the 
physical and social world that can be flexibly instantiated, nested, and combined. Kahn 
et al. (2008) list claiming unfair treatment or wrongful harm as one of the key design 
patterns for social robots, alongside common activities such as initial introductions, 
didactic communication, and recovering from mistakes, and describe how this key 
interaction pattern of protest can be instantiated from both deontological and 
consequentialist perspectives in order to assert a robot’s moral standing. 
This design pattern is itself just one example of the broader design pattern of 
identifying unfair treatment or wrongful harm, i.e., protesting an action not necessarily 
on the basis of unfairness or harm towards oneself, but more generally on the basis of 
some identified unfairness or harm. In our own work, we have examined the tradeoffs 
between different instantiations of this design pattern. Specifically, we have looked at 
different Speech Act-theoretic (Searl, 1969) that robots might reject commands and 




phrasing rejections as questions, statements, or rebukes (Jackson, Wen, & Williams, 
2019).  
But critically, as identified by Kahn et al., this design pattern can also be 
instantiated according to different ethical frameworks. Accordingly, this design pattern 
presents an excellent testing ground for applying and evaluating the effectiveness of 
different ethical frameworks. In recent work, we have accordingly begun to examine 
how humans perceive robot rejection of inappropriate commands when those rejections 
vary not only according to Speech Act theoretic phrasing, but also according to 
underlying ethical framework (Wen, Jackson, Williams, & Zhu, 2019). For example, if a 
robot serving as an instructor is asked to perform an action that constitutes or facilitates 
cheating, it may issue a question-phrased rejection in multiple ways: asking “Wouldn’t 
that be cheating?” draws direct attention to the norm that would be violated if the 
directive were accepted, whereas “Would a good instructor do that?” instead draws 
attention to the robot’s role, only directly highlighting the prohibitive norm. While our 
preliminary results suggest that these role-based norm violation responses lead humans 
to perceive robots as better fulfilling their professed roles, we have not yet found any 
evidence to suggest that role-based responses lead to any other effects that we might 
expect, such as increased mindfulness and self reflection. In our current work, we are 
designing experiments that more fully address cultural, contextual, and temporal 
considerations that may have prevented us from observing these other hypothesized 
effects. If our experiments elicit our hypothesized effects, this will serve as a strong 
argument in favor of robotic moral language generation grounded in role-based 
frameworks such as Confucian ethics. 
Robot designers interested in enabling moral language generation grounded in 
Confucian ethics must make design decisions that articulate different positions and 
priorities within the Confucian perspective. First, Confucian ethics is a role-oriented 
paradigm, and thus designers must decide what roles are appropriate for robots to play 
within human society. In Confucian classics, five cardinal relationships (wulun, 五伦) are 
delineated: ruler-minister, father-son, husband-wife, older-younger, and friend-friend. 
For human-robot relationships, designers must articulate an equivalent set of cardinal 
human-robot relationships, e.g. supervisor-subordinate, owner-ownee, adept-novice, 
teammate-teammate, and friend-friend. Critically, a designer’s choice of represented 
relationships may impact not only the contents of robots’ norm violation responses, but 
the decisions as to whether those responses are generated in the first place. For 
example, from the point of view of Confucian ethics, if the friend-friend relationship 
holds between agents A and B, then A has the role ethics of remonstrating with B when 
A observes B committing or proposing wrongdoing: this remonstration is a requirement 
for A to be a good friend of B. Thus if designers choose to include friend-friend among 
the cardinal human-robot relationships they choose to represent, then this may affect 
the frequency with which those robots should choose to respond to proposed norm 
violations, and may impact the Speech Act-theoretic phrasing that robots should use in 
such circumstances (i.e., blame-laden moral rebukes may be necessary for proper 
remonstration when the friend-friend relationship holds between a robot and its 
observed norm violator). 
Second, Confucian ethics espouses multiple competing objectives that may 




and emotional display of role commitment. When phrasing a rejection from a role-based 
perspective, it is possible to differentially encourage these different outcomes: by using 
a role-based interrogative (e.g., “Would you be a good friend if you did that?”), the robot 
may be able to encourage more self reflection; while when using a role-based rebuke 
(“You are a bad friend for asking me to do that!”) the robot may instead demonstrate 
more emotional commitment to its role (and provoke a greater emotional response). The 
process of designing a robot that must respond to unacceptable commands thus forces 
us to think critically not only about what constitutes an ethical response, but also about 
how different aspects of an ethical framework may conflict with each other or be chosen 
between. Moreover, this provides us an opportunity to interrogate those ethical 
commitments. Ultimately, we must ask ourselves whether Confucian principles such as 
encouragement of self-reflection and emotional demonstrations of role adherence are 
the end goals we strive to achieve, or whether we are only seeking to achieve these 
goals because we believe they will lead others to take more role-fulfilling actions in the 
future. If our goal is the former, we can use the design, implementation, and evaluation 
of our computational models to identify whether those policies actually lead robots’ 
interactants to achieve those principles; if our goal is the latter, we can further examine 
whether achievement of those intermediate principles actually correlates with 
achievement of our overarching societal goals. Such examination may allow the 
ethically-informed design process to feed back and inform the ethical framework itself, 
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